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South Korea currently records the lowest fertility rate in the world.
This article provides an accessible yet comprehensive overview of the structural causes, social, economic, and cultural background, and realistic policy challenges behind Korea’s low birth rate, helping international readers better understand the realities and long-term tasks facing Korean society.
Dear readers, welcome.
Today, I would like to discuss one of the most serious structural crises facing South Korean society: the low birth rate. Some readers may feel that my previous posts have focused mainly on Korea’s proud culture and traditions. Following my recent article on Korea’s retirement challenges, I believe that introducing another important social issue will help deepen global understanding of Korea’s current reality and future challenges. That is why I have chosen to address the issue of low fertility today.
Let us begin.
South Korea is widely known as a country that achieved rapid industrialization and democratization in a relatively short period of time. However, behind this remarkable success lies a demographic problem of an unprecedented scale: an extraordinary decline in the birth rate.
Low fertility in Korea cannot be explained simply as an individual decision “not to have children.” Rather, it is the result of interconnected structural pressures, including labor markets, housing, education, gender equality, social norms, and generational dynamics. In many ways, it reflects a system that places excessive burdens on individuals.
In particular, self-employed business owners and corporate managers in Korea are already experiencing the effects firsthand. Finding workers is becoming increasingly difficult, and this labor shortage is directly linked to national competitiveness and long-term economic sustainability.
South Korea’s total fertility rate has already reached the lowest level globally. While some European countries and Japan also face declining birth rates, Korea’s situation is far more severe in both speed and depth.
Many international readers ask, “Why is Korea’s birth rate so exceptionally low?” The answer is not simple. Korea’s demographic decline cannot be explained by economic factors alone. Rather, it is best understood as the accumulated outcome of long-term structural pressures across society.
One feature often cited as common to both Korea and Japan is a seniority-based employment system. This structure tends to disadvantage younger generations, weakening the economic foundation of people in their 20s and 30s—the very age group most likely to marry and have children.
In systems where length of service outweighs performance and capability, companies hesitate to hire new employees, and young workers are forced to endure prolonged periods of low wages. As a result, marriage and childbirth come to be viewed as financially unrealistic choices.
In contrast, in parts of the United States and Europe, individuals can often secure relatively stable incomes earlier in their careers. In Korea, however, entry into the workforce is delayed, and meaningful compensation is postponed.
Korean youth tend to enter full participation in society later than their peers elsewhere, due to extended education, job preparation, and mandatory military service. This delay naturally leads to later marriage and, in many cases, the abandonment of childbirth altogether.
In a social environment where university education has become virtually mandatory, the burden of student loan debt is also significant. The longer the period of education, the more childbirth is postponed.
Simply shortening years of education has met with strong resistance and has failed to provide fundamental solutions. What truly matters is a culture in which diverse pathways into society and careers are respected.
In Korean society, raising a child often means entering an intense education competition. This reality represents one of the most powerful psychological and financial deterrents to childbirth.
Rising housing prices in districts associated with elite schools are closely linked to fertility decisions. As such, education costs and real estate pressures form a central pillar of Korea’s low birth rate problem.
South Korea remains one of the OECD countries with the longest working hours. A culture of excessive labor has pushed childcare and family life into the realm of personal sacrifice.
Although maternity leave and parental leave exist in law, many workers still fear career disadvantages if they use these benefits. This undermines the practical effectiveness of such policies.
These challenges are especially severe in small and medium-sized enterprises and among the self-employed.
Population and resources in Korea are heavily concentrated in the Seoul metropolitan area, driving housing costs sharply upward and destabilizing the lives of younger generations.
This concentration is not merely a regional imbalance—it is a structural issue directly connected to fertility. Without stable housing, marriage and childbirth become increasingly unrealistic.
Gender conflict is another important background factor in Korea’s low birth rate. Mutual distrust and extreme narratives make it difficult to form social consensus on marriage and family life.
International examples show that in countries where gender equality is institutionally well established, highly educated women often exhibit higher fertility rates.
Korea, too, must move beyond ideological confrontation toward practical institutional reform and the restoration of social trust.
The Korean government has implemented various pro-natalist policies, but short-term cash incentives alone cannot resolve deeply rooted structural issues.
Birth support should not be treated merely as a population policy. It must be approached as a comprehensive social policy that guarantees quality of life.
Support for infertility treatment, expanded childcare infrastructure, and housing stability policies must be designed with a long-term and integrated perspective.
Korea’s low birth rate is not a uniquely national phenomenon. It serves as a warning signal for other highly competitive societies that may face similar futures.
Rather than focusing solely on fertility statistics, I believe the key lies in creating a society where people feel that having children is a reasonable and sustainable choice.
Korea’s current experience offers important lessons for other countries. Low birth rates are not simply the result of individual decisions—they are, above all, the outcome of social structures.
Thank you very much for reading to the end.
I look forward to meeting you again with new content in the future.